Greater China and the Political Economy of Regionalisation *
It is not that long ago when the study of China's political economy could all but ignore the external dynamic of the global political economy. But with China's insertion into that global political economy -particularly after Deng Xiaoping's nanxun 南巡 in 1992 -not only has China become embedded in the global, but the global is also increasingly embedding itself in China.
One of the most striking features of this change is the extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) into China, particularly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, has driven an export boom -an export boom which itself has been the major engine of domestic economic growth in China. In this respect, the term "Greater China" is a useful addition to the lexicon of discourses on understanding economic change in contemporary China. It draws attention to the increasingly transnational nature of economic activity and the disjuncture between national boundaries as the limits of political space 1 .
However, we need to take care about the way we construct a notion of a Greater
China economic space to ensure that we do not obscure as much as we elucidate about the dynamics of transnational economic processes. "Greater China" can be both too big and too small. In many cases the term "Greater China" is simply used as a shorthand way of aggregating the economies of mainland China, the two Special Autonomous Regions of Macao and Hong Kong, and Taiwan 2 . But while some areas of the PRC are clearly becoming more closely integrated into the regional and global economy, other areas (and economic sectors) are not. Other understandings of a Greater China economic space are too small, in that they try to construct a very narrow conception of regional integration that pays insufficient attention to the role of extra-regional actors and interests, wider processes of East Asian regionalisation, and the significance of globalising processes.
In considering the possible emergence of a Greater China economic space, we need to consider three key characteristics of regionalisation. First, if we retain a geographic focus for regionalisation, then we should not simply think in terms of integration between entire national territories. Across the globe, it is often two or more subnational entities that are becoming integrated -it is not regionalisation but "microregionalisation" 3 . Under this understanding, international economic integration and the creation of a transnational regional space can contribute to national economic fragmentation and disjunctures in the national economic space. Second, there are multiple forms of transnational economic spaces that often overlap with each other.
Greater China economic regionalisation occurs, and is largely driven by, wider processes of East Asian regionalisation, which themselves interacts with, and are largely driven by, wider global processes.
Third, there is the problem of cartography. By this I refer to understandings of economic space which, whilst trying to move away from the nation state and political boundaries as the basis of analysis, are still based on constructing geographically bound conceptions. The boundaries to economic spaces may no longer be individual national political boundaries, but are instead the cumulative national boundaries of the regional states and territories. Rather than conceive as economic space as nationally bound, we can instead conceive of economic spaces that are embedded in "commodity driven production networks" 4 that are trans or supranational in nature.
Transnational Economic Spaces: Regionalisation and Regionalism
The study of regional integration is often predicated on key assumptions about both the processes and outcomes of integrative projects that are not always efficacious for studying East Asia. For example, Balassa's influential work on economic integration established a model which started from formal co-operation between states followed by the progressive movement towards a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, monetary union and finally total economic integration 5 . It was a predictive model that expects certain formal intergovernmental action before we can say that "economic integration" has occurred.
In addition, the study of regionalism as a sub-set of political economy has been heavily influenced by the European experience -and in many respects too heavily influenced. The construction of a European mode of regional governance after World War Two has become not so much an example of regional construction, but all but the archetypal model against which other regional projects are judged. A number of scholars explicitly took the European experience as a predictor for the future of regionalism elsewhere 6 . Despite the decline in predictive models of regionalism based on the European experience in the mid-1970s 7 , there remains in much scholarship an understanding that regionalism will entail at least some of the institutionalisation exhibited in the European model, and there is often an implicit understanding that something like the European Union will be the end point of integrative processes 8 .
This emphasis on intergovernmentalism as the main dynamic behind interpretations of processes of regional integration frustrated those who argued that real economic integration was occurring across national political boundaries where there was no formal intergovernmental agreement or institutionalisation -processes that were not captured by statist top down definitions of regionalism. As such, a common theme in the expanding literature on "new regionalism" is the need to distinguish between the different types of regional processes. Thus, "regionalism" has widely become accepted to refer to the conscious and deliberate attempts by national states to create formal mechanisms for dealing with common transnational issues through intergovernmental dialogue and treaty. By contrast, "regionalisation" thus conceived as an undirected process of growing interdependence which originates in the actions of individuals, groups and corporations rather than through the deliberate actions of national governments 9 . While accepting that governments and intergovernmental dialogue remain important, the emphasis here is on other actors and other forms of interaction across national political borders that tie people and economies together.
These two types of processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, some theorists see regionalism as a response to regionalisation. Neofunctionalists and neoliberal institutionalists share a conviction that as economic activity becomes more international, states co-operate to find regional solutions to common problems. While this may originally take the form of informal or ad hoc co-operation, they typically become formalised in regional organisations. Neofunctionalists argue that while such co-operation usually originates in the economic sphere, it will eventually "spillover"
into other forms of joint political co-operation, and eventually to political integration and the transcendence of the state. Thus, political integration can be seen as the unintentional consequence of a number of smaller economic decisions by non-state actors 10 .
But while an emphasis on regionalisation might, from some perspectives, be the precursor to the establishment of formal regionalism, there is no assumption in the literature of "new regionalisms" of convergence towards a final form of regional governance. Rather there is an acceptance of diversity. As Smart argues:
"capitalist practices are embedded in local structures, and that certain contexts can generate new and vibrant variations upon the theme of capitalism. If nothing else, globalization produces a considerably diverse set of local outcomes" 11 Thus, we should expect increased economic interaction to produce a variety of different processes of regional economic integration -not all of which will lead to formal regionalism.
Indeed, for those who point to the importance of the deterritorialisation of production, there is little or no evidence to suggest that regionalisation will lead to regionalism.
For many, the key to understanding globalisation is a knowledge of "post-Taylorist 'flexible'" 12 approaches to the organization of production within and between firms.
'capitalism today…entails the detailed disaggregation of stages of production and consumption across national boundaries, under the organizational structure of densely networked firms or enterprises' . 13 While the international economy of the Bretton Woods era characterised by exchange relations between national economies, the new political economy is grounded in:
'the structural power of internationally mobile capital. 
Great China and Regionalisation

Intra-regional FDI
The prima facie evidence for the existence of a Greater China economic space is built 1998, this appears to have more to do with methods of identifying the nationality of investment, rather than a real decline in investment led regionalisation. Kong is a major consumer of Chinese exports, the reality is that the overwhelming majority of these exports subsequently end up elsewhere -predominantly in the US, the EU, and Japan.
Intra-regional trade
The real significance of trade for regional integration is in China's position as a recipient of imports from Taiwan and Hong Kong. This is in no small part due to the migration of Hong Kong's manufacturing industries over the border into China.
Facing rising land and labour costs, Hong Kong producers have simply moved production over the border into China is a similar way to which maquiladora factories developed in Mexico through the migration of US companies. In both examples, the core urban sector has essentially extended its economic influence over the national political border -hence the process is sometimes simply referred to as "metropolitan spillover" or as "extended metropolis" 25 . In effect, components are exported into
China from Hong Kong, and the finished produce then re-exported out through Hong Kong to markets in the developed world -as Berger and Lester argue, the goods are made in China, but made by Hong Kong 26 .
As Taiwanese firms subsequently moved much of their productive capacity to China, this similarly generated a wave of exports to China in the form of components used to manufacture finished goods to markets in third countries. What this suggests, then, is the emergence of a region of production built on a dense network of investment generated trade relationships. But crucially, it is a process of integration that has far from impacted on all of China, and one that is predicated on wider global processes, and extra-regional actors and interests.
Great China and Microregional Integration
The majority of work on regionalisms new and old concentrates on relationships between two or more nation states. However, largely inspired by the work of political and economic geographers 27 , there is a strand of literature in international political economy that points to the importance of moving away from national conceptions.
Rather, it argues that much of the real integration that is taking place -primarily economic integration -takes place below the national level 28 .
Such sub-national cross-national regional integration can take the form of formal regional agreements -for example, the growth triangles that have been a formal part of region building within ASEAN since 1992 29 . At the risk of oversimplification, we The link between the microregion and globalization is perhaps even clearer when it comes to microregionalisation. Here, there is no formal agreement and no formal conception of the borders and parameters of microregional integration. But the level of economic interaction is so great that a new economic space is created that spans national political borders. And of course, given the political difficulties that make intergovernmental dialogue between China and Taiwan so problematic, it is microregionalisation that is most germane to this study.
For China watchers, the need to disaggregate the Chinese economy to take into account regional variations is now almost taken for granted. There is now a relatively large literature on the relationship between central and local authorities in China.
Chung's "mid term appraisal" of centre local relations in 1995 showed work on centre-local relations already constituted a sizeable and growing sub-field within Chinese studies 32 . Not surprisingly, this canon of work has undergone substantial growth in the subsequent years, including the establishment of the journal "Provincial
China" in recognition of the diverse nature of politics and society beneath the national level. Although Lynne T White (1998, 1999) 
Greater China, East Asia and Globalisation
We noted above that much of what is produced through investment in China is exported to the major markets of the industrialised world -primarily North America, Japan and the European Union. Already we see here a key link between regional and global processes -if Greater China is a region of production, then this production remains largely contingent on consumer demand outside the region. But there is another dynamic here as much of the investment itself has its roots outside the region. Hong Kong will appear as originating in Japan, but when it is subsequently reinvested into China, it will appear as Hong Kong investment, thus providing more statistics to support the case for economic integration and even microregional integration in Greater China.
When we add this to direct Sino-Japanese trade and direct Japanese FDI into China, then the case for a Greater-China economic space, rather than a wider Japan-centred regionalisation process, appears to diminish in force. At the very least, Greater
Chinese regional integration should be viewed in the light of wider regional processes.
But it is not just Japan that provides a disguised extra-regional source of investment. companies come a close second (437) 48 . Of course, not all of these companies are in
Hong Kong just to access China, and not all of them will be sources of "Hong Kong"
investment. Indeed, it is all but impossible to calculate the extent to which investment in China from Hong Kong originates from these regional offices of foreign companies. Perhaps the best we can say is that Hong Kong remains an important platform for third party investment into China which is not revealed by looking at the official investment statistics.
It becomes even more difficult to calculate the real extent of non-Chinese investment in China when we consider the extent of sub-contracted FDI. Here, third country investors do not directly invest in China either directly or through regional offices, but instead sub-contract production to investment companies within the Greater China region itself. Such investment has been a major element in western companies involvement in China in textiles, clothing and shoes, toys, and more recently, This assertion is supported by interviews in Hong Kong. Certain US based companies, use sub-contracting through Hong Kong because they fear that being associated with sweat-shop production would severely damage their image (and therefore sales) at home. They can genuinely argue that they don't invest in sweat-shops -but it does not necessarily mean that products carrying their brand names are not produced in sweat shops.
Second, the intermediary companies market themselves as matchmakers with specialist knowledge of China. They have the linguistic skills, they know the culture, and they have the personal contacts that are so important for doing business in China 54 . In many respects, they exploit the idea that doing business in China is best left to the Chinese themselves, and that only those within Greater China can really understand Greater China.
This type of production process is referred to as "demand-responsive reflexive" 55 . In real words, this means that major corporations do not have to worry about maintaining factories staffed by workers who will not only require higher wages than need to be paid in China, but also welfare contributions and redundancy payments if production is cut back during times of slack demand. Indeed, an increasing number of major multinational companies simply do not produce anything themselves anymore focussing on establishing brand names through PR and marketing 56 . Even research and development is now frequently devolved to contract manufacturers like Flextronics, which operates out of Singapore and invests in China for a host of major global IT producers. And while such outsourcing through contract manufacturing has long been a feature of the textile and apparel industries, it is growing ever more significant in the IT industry, growing at 20 to 25 per cent per annum 57 .
As China has become the "world's outsourcer of first resort" 58 , it has become engaged in this global division of production -typically at the low tech and low value added processing stage. In all these cases, the 'Made in China' brand will appear on 
Whose Region?
There is a general tendency to assume that regional integration is a positive thing.
Welfare gains are typically forecast through the reduction of transaction costs, the exploitation of economic complementarity and the creation of integrated markets.
While this assumption is more applicable to formal regionalism rather than regionalisation, there is still a largely positive economic conception of integrationnot least through the transfer of technology and expertise from cores to peripheries. So economic growth that has been achieved in Hong Kong and Taiwan through integration with the Chinese economy has been largely jobless growth. Whether regionalisation is a good thing or not depends. For business interests provided with an opportunity to reduce manufacturing costs and increase profits, it is a very good thing indeed. For workers, particularly low skilled labourers, it is a very different matter.
Conclusions
This paper has assessed the notion of a Greater China economic space in light of three approaches to understanding international political economy. The first is sub-regional integration. This approach maintains a strong notion of geography and territory, and is most useful in leading towards an understanding of the processes involved in regional integration. In particular, it suggests that sub-regional integration is built on unequal levels of development. It also draws attention to the relationship between governmental decisions, and the investment decisions of non-state actors (between top down and bottom up regional processes).
Furthermore, it is an approach which stresses the importance of limiting the geographic scope of our investigation regional integration (on the PRC side at least).
We need to focus on which parts of China are becoming integrated into a Greater
China economic space, and perhaps subsequently the implications for governance in
China of an emergent dualistic economy.
While it is correct to look for perspectives that move away from traditional state centred notions of economic "space" or "territory", in doing so we should not simply create new notions of space that are equally constrained by ideas of boundaries -even if these are not state boundaries. When we question the porous nature of state borders and boundaries, we should be careful in finding new ways of re-drawing borders and boundaries. Even one of the architects of the "hyper-globalisation" thesis, Kenichi
Ohmae falls into this trap. Ohmae argues that maps obstruct our understanding of how the global economy works by placing political boundaries in the way of perceptions of economic activity 59 . Yet he too relies on cartography as the boundaries of his "region states" are drawn around geographically proximate territories -they are still geographically conceived.
Thus, following Bernard 60 and others, we can follow a network-centred approach which, drawing us even further away from the map than Ohmae, conceptualises a more complex structure built on buyer commodity driven chains of decentralised production networks 61 . At the very least, it forces us to think of the relationship between regional integration and globalisation, with the suggestion here that the latter has in many ways configured the former.
What might be called a "Coxian" approach 62 also draws us away from notions of territory and instead emphasises the importance of collaboration between transnational economic elites. As with the network approach, it stresses the importance of extra-regional economic elites, and suggests an uneven societal (rather than geographic) notion of integration -integration is for the elites not the masses (and often at the expense of the masses).
It is not my intention to deny the existence of regional integration. Rather, I suggest that in assessing the notion of a Greater China economic space, we need to consider two key issues. First, regional and global processes should be considered in tandem.
Indeed, the epistemologies deployed in this paper suggest that globalising forces have been key determinants of Greater China sub-regional integration. They also suggest that the major drivers of the global economy in the developed world -or perhaps more correctly, investors and consumers in the developed world -are key determinants of greater Chinese sub-regional integration. 
